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AGAINST THE STATUS CRIMES 
DOCTRINE 
West Menefee Bakke* 
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of “cruel and unusual 
punishments.”1 In the 1962 case Robinson v. California, the U.S. Supreme Court 
applied this provision to invalidate a state law making it a crime to be addicted to 
narcotics.2 By punishing drug addiction itself, the state had criminalized a person’s 
status rather than any conduct.3 Asserting that addiction is an illness, the Court 
proclaimed that “a law which made a criminal offense of such a disease would 
doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of cruel and unusual 
punishment.”4 The Court therefore held the statute unconstitutional,5 and this 
operation of the Eighth Amendment came to be known as the “status crimes 
doctrine.”6 
Six years later in Powell v. Texas, the Supreme Court held that a state statute 
criminalizing public intoxication did not violate the Constitution’s ban on cruel 
and usual punishments.7 The plurality recognized that the “[defendant] was 
convicted, not for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk 
on a particular occasion.”8 The plurality attempted to hamstring Robinson’s status 
crimes doctrine: “[The Eighth Amendment] does not deal with the question of 
whether certain conduct cannot constitutionally be punished because it is, in 
some sense, ‘involuntary’ . . . .”9 
Nevertheless, as a recent decision in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2021; B.B.A. in Business Honors & 
Finance, Texas A&M University, 2018. 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. 
 2. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962). 
 3. Id. at 666. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. at 667. 
 6. See, e.g., Hannah Kieschnick, Note, A Cruel and Unusual Way to Regulate the Homeless: 
Extending the Status Crimes Doctrine to Anti-Homeless Ordinances, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1569, 1578–79 
(2018). 
 7. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968) (plurality opinion). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 533. 
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Circuit illustrates, the status crimes doctrine still lingers.10 In Martin v. City of 
Boise, the Ninth Circuit considered a challenge to a pair of Boise ordinances 
banning camping on public land or occupying public places without permission.11 
In that case, six individuals experiencing homelessness were convicted for 
violating the ordinances.12 Five of them were sentenced to time served and the 
sixth to an additional day in jail.13 The individuals brought suit in federal court, 
alleging their convictions violated the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
and seeking in part a prospective injunction against the City’s enforcement of the 
ordinances.14 The Ninth Circuit sided against the City, holding that so long as 
the homeless are not provided with housing, Boise must abandon enforcement of 
the ordinances.15 The court reasoned that, so long as there are no available beds 
in shelters, prosecuting the homeless for “sitting, lying, [or] sleeping in public” 
constitutes an impermissible criminalization of their status.16 
The Ninth Circuit is the only circuit court to invalidate an anti-camping 
ordinance under the Eighth Amendment.17 Martin highlights the insufficiency of 
Supreme Court guidance on the scope of the Amendment, as well as the 
corresponding confusion among the lower courts18 as to the effect of the status 
crimes doctrine. While only two other circuits have addressed whether to apply 
the doctrine to homelessness,19 it will likely become necessary for courts to fully 
address this issue in the coming years. After all, cities’ efforts to deal with 
homelessness have become increasingly politicized,20 and ordinances banning 
camping or sleeping in public places exist throughout the country.21 
 
 10. See Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), amended by 920 F.3d 584 (9th 
Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019). 
 11. Id. at 1035. 
 12. Id. at 1037. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Id. at 1038. 
 15. See id. at 1048. 
 16. Id. (quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated, 505 
F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 17. See, e.g., Joel v. City of Orlando, 232 F.3d 1353, 1361–62 (11th Cir. 2000) (holding that an 
ordinance prohibiting sleeping on public property did not run afoul of the Eighth Amendment); cf. 
Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 892 P.2d 1145, 1166 (Cal. 1995) (rejecting an Eighth Amendment 
challenge to an ordinance nearly identical to Boise’s in Martin). But cf. Pottinger v. City of Miami, 
810 F. Supp. 1551, 1564 (S.D. Fla. 1992) (holding that Miami’s practice of “arresting homeless 
people for harmless acts they are forced to perform in public effectively punishes them for being 
homeless,” violating the Eighth Amendment). 
 18. See Juliette Smith, Comment, Arresting the Homeless for Sleeping in Public: A Paradigm for 
Expanding the Robinson Doctrine, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 293, 317 (1996) (“Because there 
was not a majority in Powell . . . , the case has left lower courts without clear guidance as to whether 
or not to apply Robinson to ‘acts’ derivative of status.”). 
 19. See Manning v. Caldwell, 900 F.3d 139, 152–53 (4th Cir. 2018) (rejecting an Eighth 
Amendment challenge to Virginia’s interdiction statute, which plaintiffs claimed criminalized their 
status as homeless alcoholics), rev’d, 930 F.3d 264, 284 (4th Cir. 2019) (sustaining the challenge but 
only on the basis that the plaintiffs’ status as alcoholics—not homeless persons—was criminalized); 
Joel, 232 F.3d at 1361–62. 
 20. See, e.g., Jack Healy, Rights Battles Emerge in Cities Where Homelessness Can Be a Crime, N.Y. 
TIMES (Jan. 9, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/09/us/rights-battles-emerge-in-cities-
where-homelessness-can-be-a-crime.html [perma.cc/EVT3-R83J]. 
 21. TRISTIA BAUMAN, NAT’L L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY, HOUSING NOT 
HANDCUFFS 2019: ENDING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMELESSNESS IN U.S. CITIES 38, 41 (2019), 
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This Case Note argues that the status crimes doctrine ought to be abandoned 
in its entirety. This would restore the Eighth Amendment to its proper meaning, 
which is to provide limits on only the method of punishment, not on the 
substantive criminal law itself. By discarding the status crimes doctrine 
altogether—or, at least, limiting it to the realm of medical conditions as the 
defendant had in Robinson—courts can shut the door on judicial activism and 
foreclose a troublesome line of argumentation by which the defendant casts their 
offense as flowing inevitably from their being. 
Part I of this Case Note briefly traces the development of the status crimes 
doctrine through the Supreme Court’s decisions in Robinson and Powell. Part II 
describes the Ninth Circuit’s panel decision in Martin and the Ninth Circuit’s 
subsequent denial of rehearing en banc. Part III argues that the decision in Martin 
was incorrect and that the status crimes doctrine ought to be abandoned. 
I.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In Robinson v. California, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of 
a portion of a California statute making it a crime to “be addicted to the use of 
narcotics.”22 Convictions under this provision did not require a showing that the 
defendant actually used narcotics—the statute thus proscribed addiction as such, 
regardless of any use thereof.23 Justice Stewart, authoring the majority opinion, 
found that the offense was “based upon a condition or status”—i.e., addiction—
not an act.24 He likened the statute to one that imposed penalties for the “crime” 
of being afflicted with leprosy, a mental illness, or a venereal disease.25 Such a law 
that punishes “an illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily,” 
Justice Stewart claimed, “would doubtless be universally thought to be an 
infliction of cruel and unusual punishment.”26 Therefore, the Court held, the 
defendant’s conviction constituted an impermissible criminalization of his status 
in violation of the Eighth Amendment.27 “To be sure,” Justice Stewart wrote, 
“imprisonment for ninety days is not, in the abstract, a punishment which is either 
cruel or unusual. But the question cannot be considered in the abstract. Even one 
day in prison would be a cruel and unusual punishment for the ‘crime’ of having 
a common cold.”28 
The Court’s decision in Robinson garnered dissents from Justices Clark and 
White. Justice Clark observed that in order to convict the defendant for his status 
as a drug addict, the jury was required to find that he used drugs “habitually.”29 
 
http://nlchp.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/HOUSING-NOT-HANDCUFFS-2019-
FINAL.pdf [perma.cc/X5CQ-FU5T]. Of the 187 American cities surveyed by a homeless advocacy 
organization in 2019, 37% prohibited camping in public, 21% prohibited sleeping in public, and 
55% prohibited sitting or lying down in public. Id. at 38, 41–42. 
 22. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 660–61 (1962). 
 23. Id. at 665–66. 
 24. Id. at 662. 
 25. Id. at 666–67. 
 26. Id. at 667. 
 27. Id. at 666–67. 
 28. Id. at 667. 
 29. Id. at 679–80 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
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Moreover, Justice Clark noted, to the extent that California’s statutory scheme 
targeted addicts, the State’s aim was preventative and rehabilitative in nature, not 
punitive, and thus lay well within its power.30 Justice White argued similarly that 
the defendant was punished not for his status as an addict but for his habitual 
drug use.31 
Six years later in Powell v. Texas, the Court considered the constitutionality of a 
Texas statute providing that “[w]hoever shall get drunk or be found in a state of 
intoxication in any public place . . . shall be fined not exceeding one hundred 
dollars.”32 The defendant challenged it as an impermissible criminalization of his 
status as a chronic alcoholic.33 At trial, a psychiatrist offered expert testimony that 
the defendant lacked “the willpower to resist the constant excessive consumption 
of alcohol,” but indicated that the defendant could control whether to take the 
first drink.34 The trial court found that the defendant was “afflicted with the 
disease of chronic alcoholism” and “[did] not appear in public by his own volition 
but under a compulsion symptomatic of the disease.”35 Even so, the trial court 
concluded, the defendant was guilty of the offense charged—“chronic alcoholism” 
was no excuse for public intoxication.36 
The Supreme Court affirmed.37 Justice Marshall, writing for a plurality of four 
Justices, cited widespread disagreement among the medical profession about the 
symptoms of alcoholism and whether it is a disease at all.38 In any event, Justice 
Marshall distinguished Robinson, observing that the defendant was punished “not 
for being a chronic alcoholic, but for being in public while drunk on a particular 
occasion.”39 For the plurality, the status crimes doctrine meant only that criminal 
laws must require the commission of some act.40 “[U]nless Robinson is so viewed,” 
Justice Marshall warned, “it is difficult to see any limiting principle that would 
serve to prevent this Court from becoming, under the aegis of the Cruel and 
Unusual Punishment Clause, the ultimate arbiter of the standards of criminal 
responsibility, in diverse areas of the criminal law, throughout the country.”41 
Justice White wrote a separate concurrence.42 To him, the defendant had failed 
to show that he could not simply do his compulsive drinking in private.43 Justice 
White therefore agreed that, on these facts, the conviction for public intoxication 
was constitutional, but he suggested that the Eighth Amendment might forbid 
punishing “the chronic alcoholic who begins drinking in private [and] at some 
 
 30. Id. at 683. 
 31. Id. at 686 (White, J., dissenting). 
 32. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968) (plurality opinion). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 517–18. 
 35. Id. at 521. 
 36. Id. at 521–22. 
 37. Id. at 537. 
 38. Id. at 522–24 (Marshall, J., joined by Warren, C.J., and Black and Harlan, JJ.) (plurality 
opinion). 
 39. Id. at 532. 
 40. Id. at 533. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 548 (White, J., concurring). 
 43. Id. at 553. 
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point becomes so drunk that he loses the power to control his movements and 
for that reason appears in public.”44 
The Powell opinion garnered a four-Justice dissent.45 Justice Fortas, writing the 
dissenting opinion, understood Robinson to stand for the broad principle that 
“[c]riminal penalties may not be inflicted upon a person for being in a condition 
he is powerless to change.”46 Justice Fortas accepted the trial court’s finding that 
the defendant was a chronic alcoholic who did not appear in public on his own 
volition.47 He acknowledged that the state’s public intoxication statute required 
an act—intoxicating oneself and appearing in a public place—but nevertheless 
considered the case indistinguishable from Robinson: “in both cases,” Justice Fortas 
contended, “the particular defendant was accused of being in a condition which 
he had no capacity to change or avoid.”48 
The Supreme Court has left the status crimes doctrine untouched since 
Powell.49 
II.  MARTIN V. CITY OF BOISE 
Two Boise ordinances were at issue in Martin.50 The first ordinance made it a 
misdemeanor to use “any of the streets, sidewalks, parks, or public places as a 
camping place at any time,” with “camping” defined as “the use of public property 
as a temporary or permanent place of dwelling, lodging, or residence.”51 The 
second prohibited “[o]ccupying, lodging, or sleeping in any building, structure, or 
public place, whether public or private . . . without the permission of the owner 
or person entitled to possession or in control thereof.”52 The plaintiffs in Martin 
were six homeless individuals, all of whom alleged citations between 2007 and 
2009 for violating at least one of the ordinances.53 In the state court proceedings 
that ensued, five of the plaintiffs were sentenced to time served, with the sixth 
sentenced to one additional day in jail.54 
The plaintiffs sued the City in federal court in late 2009 variously seeking 
damages and a prospective injunction against the ordinances’ enforcement.55 All 
 
 44. Id. at 551–52. 
 45. Id. at 554 (Fortas, J., dissenting, joined by Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart, JJ.). 
 46. Id. at 567. 
 47. Id. at 568. 
 48. Id. at 567–68. 
 49. Some Justices, however, have expressed interest in extending it to cover more than mere 
addiction. See, e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 202 n.2 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(“[U]nder Justice White’s analysis in Powell, the Eighth Amendment may pose a constitutional barrier 
to sending an individual to prison for acting on [same sex] attraction regardless of the 
circumstances.”). 
 50. See Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1035 (9th Cir. 2018), amended by 920 F.3d 584 
(9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019).  
 51. Id. (quoting BOISE, IDAHO, CITY CODE § 9-10-02 (2014) (current version at BOISE, IDAHO, 
CITY CODE § 7-3A-2(A))). 
 52. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting BOISE, IDAHO, CITY CODE § 6-01-05 (2014) (current 
version at BOISE, IDAHO, CITY CODE § 5-2-3(A)(1))). 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 1037. 
 55. Id. at 1038. All plaintiffs sought damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and some plaintiffs 
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six argued that their citations under the ordinances violated the Eighth 
Amendment.56 The district court granted summary judgment to the City on 
procedural grounds, believing that it lacked jurisdiction and that the claims were 
mooted by the police department’s announcement that it would not enforce the 
ordinances when homeless shelters in the city were at capacity.57 On appeal, the 
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, instructing the district court to reevaluate 
its jurisdiction and holding that the City failed to show that enforcement of the 
ordinances “could not reasonably be expected to recur.”58 The Ninth Circuit 
therefore held that the claims were not moot because the policy could theoretically 
be rescinded at any time at the behest of the chief of police.59 On remand, the 
district court once more granted summary judgment to the City, again on 
procedural grounds, and the plaintiffs subsequently appealed.60 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs’ claim for prospective injunctive relief against 
enforcement of the ordinances was ripe for review.61 
 
additionally sought prospective injunctive relief against enforcement of the ordinances under § 1983 
and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–02. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. According to the district court, because the validity of the plaintiffs’ convictions had 
already been litigated in state court, seeking retrospective relief in federal court “would serve as an 
end-run around the state court appellate process” and thereby violate the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. 
Bell v. City of Boise, 834 F. Supp. 2d 1103, 1110 (D. Idaho 2011), rev’d, 709 F.3d 890 (9th Cir. 
2013); see generally Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415–16 (1923); D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. 
Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482–86 (1983) (preventing lower federal courts from exercising appellate 
review over final state court judgments). 
 58. Martin, 902 F.3d at 1038–39 (quoting Bell, 709 F.3d at 898). On the jurisdictional issue, the 
Ninth Circuit reasoned that the plaintiffs’ suit in federal court was not an “appeal” forbidden under 
Rooker–Feldman, because the alleged legal wrong lay in the City’s acts, not the state court’s. Bell, 709 
F.3d at 897. 
 59. Martin, 902 F.3d at 1039. 
 60. Id. at 1039–40. Specifically, the district court held that the plaintiffs’ claims for both 
retrospective and prospective relief under § 1983 were barred by Heck v. Humphrey. Id. at 1039; see 
generally Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 486–87 (1994) (“[I]n order to recover damages for 
allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose 
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the 
conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared 
invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal 
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.”). Moreover, the district court held that, although the 
plaintiffs’ claim for prospective relief under the Declaratory Judgment Act was not barred by Heck, 
the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring such a claim because the City had by then amended the 
ordinances in 2014 to permit camping or sleeping in a public place when no shelter space was 
available. Martin, 902 F.3d at 1039. Indeed, the district court found that the record “suggest[ed] there 
[wa]s no known citation of a homeless individual under the Ordinances for camping or sleeping on 
public property on any night or morning when he or she was unable to secure shelter due to a lack 
of shelter capacity,” and “there ha[d] not been a single night when all three shelters in Boise called 
in to report they were simultaneously full for men, women or families.” Id. at 1039–40. 
 61. Martin, 902 F.3d at 1040–46. First, the Ninth Circuit addressed the dismissal of plaintiffs’ 
claims for lack of standing. Id. at 1040–42. The court held that the plaintiffs indeed had standing to 
seek prospective relief because even though the City had amended both ordinances to provide for 
non-enforcement when the shelters were at full capacity, the City still wholly relied on the homeless 
shelters themselves for reporting whether they were full. Id. at 1040. Moreover, the plaintiffs had 
adduced sufficient evidence that the shelters do turn away individuals who had stayed there for too 
many days in a row. Id. at 1041. Thus, the court held that the plaintiffs had standing to seek 
prospective relief because they “ha[d] demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether 
they face a credible risk of prosecution under the ordinances in the future on a night when they have 
been denied access to Boise’s homeless shelters.” Id. at 1042. Second, the Ninth Circuit addressed 
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The Ninth Circuit then turned to the merits.62 The court looked to the 
Supreme Court’s status crimes cases for guidance.63 The Ninth Circuit, dissecting 
the Powell decision, drew on Justice White’s concurrence and the four-Justice 
dissent to fashion the principle that “the Eighth Amendment prohibits the state 
from punishing an involuntary act or condition if it is the unavoidable 
consequence of one’s status or being.”64 
Applying this principle to the homeless plaintiffs’ Eighth Amendment 
challenge in Martin, the Ninth Circuit held the Boise ordinances unconstitutional 
because they “criminalize[d] conduct that is an unavoidable consequence of being 
homeless—namely sitting, lying, or sleeping on the streets.”65 Thus, the Ninth 
Circuit extended the status crimes doctrine to cover “the state of being ‘homeless 
in public.’”66 The court declared that “in no way” should its holding be taken to 
mean that the City must provide shelter to homeless individuals, but merely that 
the City cannot prosecute them when the number of available beds in shelters is 
insufficient.67 
The City petitioned for a rehearing en banc.68 The petition was denied over 
two vigorous dissents.69 The principal dissent, authored by Judge Milan Smith and 
joined by five others, criticized the original panel for “badly misconstru[ing] . . . 
Supreme Court precedent, and craft[ing] a holding that has begun wreaking havoc 
on local governments, residents, and businesses throughout our circuit.”70 Judge 
Smith’s primary criticism was that the panel drew the wrong principle from 
Powell—the views of dissenting Justices in a fragmented court such as the one in 
Powell, he contended, do not constitute the holding.71 Judge Smith would have 
upheld the constitutionality of the Boise ordinances on the ground that Robinson 
and Powell stand for the narrow proposition that, under the Cruel and Unusual 
Punishments Clause, a conviction requires the commission of some act.72 
Moreover, Judge Smith observed, Martin’s holding was far from a narrow one—
under the panel’s decision, cities now must “either undertake an overwhelming 
financial responsibility to provide housing for or count the number of homeless 
individuals within their jurisdiction every night, or abandon enforcement of a 
host of laws regulating public health and safety.”73 And “the panel’s decision,” 
 
the district court’s holding that the plaintiffs’ claims were barred by Heck. Id. at 1042, 1044–46. The 
court’s analysis led it to conclude that only the plaintiffs’ claims for retrospective relief were properly 
dismissed under Heck—their claims for prospective relief ought not to have been barred. Id. at 1046. 
 62. Id. at 1046. 
 63. Id. at 1046–48. 
 64. Id. at 1048 (quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1135 (9th Cir. 2006), 
vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007)). 
 65. Id. (quoting Jones, 444 F.3d at 1137). 
 66. Id. (quoting Jones, 444 F.3d at 1137). 
 67. Id. (quoting Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138). 
 68. See Martin v. City of Boise, 920 F.3d 584, 588 (9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 
(2019). 
 69. See id. at 590–99 (M. Smith, J., dissenting); id. at 599–603 (Bennett, J., dissenting). 
 70. Id. at 590 (M. Smith, J., dissenting, joined by Callahan, Bea, Ikuta, Bennett, and R. Nelson, 
JJ.). 
 71. Id. at 591 (quoting Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977)). 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 594. 
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Judge Smith wrote, “will inevitably result in the striking down of laws that prohibit 
public defecation and urination.”74 
III.  CASE ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Martin was incorrect. Instead of relegating the 
status crimes doctrine to the limited context of disease, the Ninth Circuit 
expanded it to cover homelessness. But the doctrine ought to be restricted for two 
reasons: (1) it betrays a proper understanding of the Eighth Amendment by 
eliding the distinction between the method of punishment and the substantive 
prohibition itself; and (2) it opens the door for judicial activism by licensing the 
judge as moral arbiter, striking down democratically adopted legislation to the 
extent that defendants can simply characterize their offensive conduct as an 
inevitable consequence of their being. 
First, the status crimes doctrine misinterprets the text and history of the Eighth 
Amendment, which does not place limitations on the content of the criminal law 
itself. By its terms, the Amendment speaks to procedure, not substance.75 The 
drafters of the Bill of Rights inserted the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause 
to circumscribe permissible methods of punishment, not the elements of an 
offense.76 In other words, the Clause does not place substantive limits on what 
may be punished. Instead, the Amendment merely functions as a limitation on 
how a crime may be punished.77 In outlawing “cruel and unusual punishments,” 
the Founders had in mind torturous methods of punishment.78 But the plaintiffs 
in Martin were not drawn and quartered—they merely spent time in jail.79 If 
constitutional provisions ought to be interpreted in accordance with original 
intent, the status crimes doctrine represents an impermissible divergence from a 
proper understanding of the Eighth Amendment. 
But even assuming the Founders’ intent is irrelevant, any substantive 
limitations on the criminal law itself arising from the Amendment should at least 
flow from the text. The Clause forbids “cruel and unusual punishments”—not just 
“cruel punishments.”80 But when the Supreme Court formulated the doctrine in 
 
 74. Id. at 596; see generally Kate Reilly, San Francisco to Launch ‘Poop Patrol’ to Clean Up Streets 
Amid Homelessness Crisis, TIME (Aug. 15, 2018, 8:41 PM), https://time.com/5368610/san-francisco-
poop-patrol-problem/ [perma.cc/VM95-FFJX]. 
 75. See U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
 76. See generally Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive Criminal Law, 
79 HARV. L. REV. 635, 636–39 (1966). 
 77. See Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 99 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“It is by now well 
established that the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause was originally understood as prohibiting 
torturous ‘methods of punishment . . . .’”) (quoting Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 979 (1991) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 78. See BENJAMIN L. OLIVER, THE RIGHTS OF AN AMERICAN CITIZEN 186 (1832) (the Eighth 
Amendment prohibits such “barbarous and cruel punishments” as “[b]reaking on the wheel, flaying 
alive, rending asunder with horses, . . . maiming, mutilating and scourging to death”). 
 79. See Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1037 (9th Cir. 2018), amended by 920 F.3d 584 
(9th Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 674 (2019). Of the six plaintiffs, five were sentenced to time 
served, and one was sentenced to one additional day in jail. Id. 
 80. U.S. CONST. AMEND. VIII. 
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Robinson, it skirted half the analysis: in his opinion for the Court, Justice Stewart 
did not attempt to investigate whether other states criminalized addiction.81 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit in Martin glossed over the “unusual” prong82—had it 
not done so, it would have discovered that ordinances such as Boise’s are 
commonplace: of 187 American cities surveyed in 2019, 37% prohibited camping 
in public, 21% prohibited sleeping in public, and 55% prohibited sitting or lying 
down in public.83 Punishing violators of these ordinances can hardly be deemed 
“unusual.” 
Second, the status crimes doctrine’s lack of a coherent limiting principle opens 
the door for judicial activism.84 It takes the Eighth Amendment’s relatively 
straightforward punishment inquiry and replaces it with a freewheeling 
assessment in which an unelected judge decides whether the prohibited conduct 
itself is morally blameworthy.85 In this respect, the doctrine evokes the Lochner era, 
where unelected judges took it upon themselves to determine whether a particular 
law befitted the people.86 To the extent that the status crimes doctrine operates to 
place substantive limits on local communities’ abilities to regulate certain 
undesirable behavior—such as “sitting, sleeping, or lying” in public areas87—it 
erroneously allows judges to substitute their personal predilections for the 
judgments of the legislature.88 
Some sort of limiting principle to the status crimes doctrine could perhaps 
serve to constrain this sort of judicial activism. Such a limiting principle would 
most naturally lie in the Eighth Amendment’s text, which suggests that the judge 
must first find that a particular criminalization of status is unusual.89 But the 
Martin court did not deign to investigate whether the homeless individuals’ 
convictions were actually unusual; instead, the court sufficed itself to find the laws 
per se “cruel and unusual” under Robinson.90 By contrast, the Powell plurality 
understood the necessity of a limiting principle and attempted to restrain the 
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status crimes doctrine to merely require that criminal offenses involve the 
commission of some act.91 But that view failed to garner a majority—the five other 
Justices in Powell refused to so restrict Robinson.92 
As a result, the primary limitation on the judge’s discretion to strike down 
democratically adopted legislation under the doctrine appears to hinge upon the 
defendant’s ability to cast their offense as an unavoidable consequence of their 
being. But it is not difficult to argue that one has no control over their undesirable 
actions. For example, an individual convicted of a violent crime might claim that 
their anti-social actions resulted as an inevitable consequence of upbringing or an 
inherent propensity toward aggressive behavior.93 Such rationalizations may well 
be correct—after all, recent advances in neuroscience suggest that individuals have 
less control over their actions than previously thought,94 and many contemporary 
philosophers contend that humans lack free will altogether.95 Nevertheless, the 
law must remain steadfast in its belief that individuals are accountable for their 
actions.96 The more the law lends credence to deterministic argumentation, the 
more it loses force as a tool to regulate standards of conduct.97 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Martin was incorrect. By holding as it did, the 
Ninth Circuit defied the Powell plurality’s limits on Robinson, extending the status 
crimes doctrine to cover a person’s homeless status. But in doing so, the Ninth 
Circuit flouted the real meaning of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause, 
opening the door for judicial activism to the extent that defendants can 
characterize their unlawful behavior as a consequence of their status. 
And in light of the Supreme Court’s refusal to review the Ninth Circuit’s 
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decision,98 the resulting circuit split on the constitutionality of anti-camping 
ordinances will stand for the time being. Nevertheless, given the resurgence of 
textualism in the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence,99 it remains possible that the 
Court may overturn the status crimes doctrine in the near future. But until the 
Court does so, the best circuit courts can do is to limit Robinson and Powell to their 
facts, as cases dealing only with the criminalization of addiction. In this way, 
courts can steer clear of expanding the status crimes doctrine and adhere as closely 
as possible to a sound interpretation of the Eighth Amendment. 
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